财务会计理论 英文2025|PDF|Epub|mobi|kindle电子书版本百度云盘下载

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1 Introduction1

1.1 The Objective of This Book1

1.2 Some Historical Perspective1

1.3 A Note on Ethical Behaviour10

1.4 The Complexity of Information in Financial Accounting and Reporting11

1.5 The Role of Accounting Research12

1.6 The Importance of Information Asymmetry13

1.7 The Fundamental Problem of Financial Accounting Theory14

1.8 Regulation as a Reaction to the Fundamental Problem15

1.9 The Organization of This Book16

1.9.1 Ideal Conditions16

1.9.2 Adverse Selection16

1.9.3 Moral Hazard17

1.9.4 Standard Setting18

1.9.5 The Process of Standard Setting18

1.10 Relevance of Financial Accounting Theory to Accounting Practice21

2 Accounting Under Ideal Conditions24

2.1 Overview24

2.2 The Present Value Model Under Certainty25

2.2.1 Summary28

2.3 The Present Value Model Under Uncertainty29

2.3.1 Summary35

2.4 Reserve Recognition Accounting(RRA)35

2.4.1 An Example of RRA35

2.4.2 Summary38

2.4.3 Critique of RRA38

2.4.4 Summary41

2.5 Historical Cost Accounting Revisited41

2.5.1 Comparison of Different Measurement Bases41

2.5.2 Accruals43

2.5.3 Summary45

2.6 The Non-Existence of True Net Income45

2.7 Conclusion to Accounting Under Ideal Conditions47

3 The Decision Usefulness Approach to Financial Reporting58

3.1 Overview58

3.2 The Decision Usefulness Approach59

3.2.1 Summary60

3.3 Single-Person Decision Theory60

3.3.1 Decision Theory Applied61

3.3.2 The Information System64

3.3.3 Information Defined68

3.3.4 Summary68

3.4 The Rational,Risk-Averse Investor68

3.5 The Principle of Portfolio Diversification71

3.5.1 Summary76

3.6 The Optimal Investment Decision76

3.6.1 Summary78

3.7 Portfolio Risk79

3.7.1 Calculating and Interpreting Beta79

3.7.2 Portfolio Expected Value and Variance81

3.7.3 Portfolio Risk as the Number of Securities Increases82

3.7.4 Summary83

3.8 The Reaction of Professional Accounting Bodies to the Decision Usefulness Approach83

3.8.1 Summary87

3.9 Conclusions on Decision Usefulness87

4 Efficient Securities Markets98

4.1 Overview98

4.2 Efficient Securities Markets99

4.2.1 The Meaning of Efficiency99

4.2.2 How Do Market Prices Fully Reflect All Available Information?101

4.2.3 Summary104

4.3 Implications of Efficient Securities Markets for Financial Reporting104

4.3.1 Implications104

4.3.2 Summary106

4.4 The Informativeness of Price107

4.4.1 A Logical Inconsistency107

4.4.2 Summary110

4.5 A Capital Asset Pricing Model110

4.6 Information Asymmetry114

4.6.1 A Closer Look at Information Asymmetry114

4.6.2 Summary117

4.7 The Social Significance of Securities Markets that Work Well118

4.8 An Example of Full Disclosure119

4.8.1 Introduction119

4.8.2 Management Discussion and Analysis119

4.9 Conclusions on Efficient Securities Markets135

5 The Information Approach to Decision Usefulness143

5.1 Overview143

5.2 Outline of the Research Problem145

5.2.1 Reasons for Market Response145

5.2.2 Finding the Market Response146

5.2.3 Separating Market-Wide and Firm-Specific Factors146

5.2.4 Comparing Returns and Income148

5.3 The Ball and Brown Study149

5.3.1 Methodology and Findings149

5.3.2 Causation Versus Association151

5.3.3 Outcomes ofthe BB Study153

5.4 Earnings Response Coefficients153

5.4.1 Reasons for Differential Market Response154

5.4.2 Implications of ERC Research159

5.4.3 Measuring Investors'Earnings Expectations159

5.4.4 Summary161

5.5 Unusual,Non-recurring,and Extraordinary Items162

5.6 A Caveat about the"Best"Accounting Policy164

5.7 The Information Content of Other Financial Statement Information166

5.8 Conclusions on the Information Approach167

6 The Measurement Approach to Decision Usefulness177

6.1 Overview177

6.2 Are Securities Markets Fully Efficient?178

6.2.1 Introduction178

6.2.2 Prospect Theory180

6.2.3 Is Beta Dead?183

6.2.4 Excess Stock Market Volatility185

6.2.5 Stock Market Bubbles186

6.2.6 Efficient Securities Market Anomalies186

6.2.7 Implications of Securities Market Inefficiency for Financial Reporting189

6.2.8 Discussion of Market Efficiency Versus Behavioural Finance191

6.2.9 Conclusions About Securities Market Efficiency195

6.3 Other Reasons Supporting a Measurement Approach195

6.4 The Value Relevance of Financial Statement Information196

6.5 Ohlson's Clean Surplus Theory198

6.5.1 Three Formulae for Firm Value198

6.5.2 Earnings Persistence201

6.5.3 Estimating Firm Value204

6.5.4 Empirical Studies of the Clean Surplus Model208

6.5.5 Summary209

6.6 Auditors'Legal Liability210

6.7 Asymmetry of Investor Losses212

6.8 Conclusions on the Measurement Approach to Decision Usefulness216

7 Measurement Applications228

7.1 Overview228

7.2 Longstanding Measurement Examples230

7.2.1 Accounts Receivable and Payable230

7.2.2 Cash Flows Fixed by Contract231

7.2.3 The Lower-of-Cost-or-Market Rule231

7.2.4 Revaluation Option for Property,Plant,and Equipment232

7.2.5 Ceiling Test for Property,Plant,and Equipment232

7.2.6 Pensions and Other Post-Employment Benefits233

7.2.7 Summary235

7.3 Financial Instruments235

7.3.1 Introduction235

7.3.2 Valuation of Debt and Equity Securities236

7.3.3 Conclusion239

7.3.4 Derivative Instruments239

7.3.5 Hedge Accounting243

7.3.6 Conclusion248

7.4 Accounting for Intangibles248

7.4.1 Introduction248

7.4.2 Accounting for Purchased Goodwill249

7.4.3 Self-Developed Goodwill252

7.4.4 The Clean Surplus Model Revisited254

7.4.5 Summary255

7.5 Reporting on Risk255

7.5.1 Beta Risk255

7.5.2 Why Do Firms Manage Firm-Specific Risk?257

7.5.3 Stock Market Reaction to Other Risks258

7.5.4 A Measurement Approach to Risk Reporting260

7.5.5 Summary262

7.6 Conclusions on Measurement Applications263

8 Economic Consequences and Positive Accounting Theory273

8.1 Overview273

8.2 The Rise of Economic Consequences275

8.2.1 Summary276

8.3 Employee Stock Options277

8.4 The Relationship between Efficient Securities Market Theory and Economic Consequences283

8.5 The Positive Theory of Accounting284

8.5.1 Outline of Positive Accounting Theory284

8.5.2 The Three Hypotheses of Positive Accounting Theory287

8.5.3 Empirical PAT Research290

8.5.4 Distinguishing the Opportunistic and Efficient Contracting Versions of PAT294

8.6 Conclusions on Economic Consequences and Positive Accounting Theory296

9 An Analysis of Conflict304

9.1 Overview304

9.2 Understanding Game Theory305

9.3 A Non-Cooperative Game Model of Manager-Investor Conflict306

9.3.1 Summary312

9.4 Some Models of Cooperative Game Theory313

9.4.1 Introduction313

9.4.2 Agency Theory:An Employment Contract Between Firm Owner and Manager313

9.5 Manager's Information Advantage325

9.5.1 Earnings Management325

9.5.2 Controlling Earnings Management329

9.6 Discussion and Summary331

9.7 Agency Theory:A Bondholder-Manager Lending Contract332

9.7.1 Summary335

9.8 Implications of Agency Theory for Accounting335

9.8.1 Is Two Better Than One?335

9.8.2 Rigidity of Contracts339

9.9 Reconciliation of Efficient Securities Market Theory with Economic Consequences341

9.10 Conclusions on the Analysis of Conflict341

10 Executive Compensation356

10.1 Overview356

10.2 Are Incentive Contracts Necessary?357

10.3 A Managerial Compensation Plan360

10.4 The Theory of Executive Compensation372

10.4.1 The Relative Proportions of Net Income and Share Price in Evaluating Manager Performance372

10.4.2 Short-Run and Long-Run Effort374

10.4.3 The Role of Risk in Executive Compensation377

10.5 Empirical Compensation Research381

10.6 The Politics of Executive Compensation383

10.7 The Power Theory of Executive Compensation386

10.8 The Social Significance of Managerial Labour Markets that Work Well389

10.9 Conclusions on Executive Compensation389

11 Earnings Management402

11.1 Overview402

11.2 Patterns of Earnings Management405

11.3 Evidence of Earnings Management for Bonus Purposes406

11.4 Other Motivations for Earnings Management411

11.4.1 Other Contracting Motivations411

11.4.2 To Meet Investors'Earnings Expectations and Maintain Reputation413

11.4.3 Initial Public Offerings414

11.5 The Good Side of Earnings Management415

11.5.1 Blocked Communication415

11.5.2 Theory and Empirical Evidence of Good Earnings Management416

11.6 The Bad Side of Earnings Management422

11.6.1 Opportunistic Earnings Management422

11.6.2 Do Managers Accept Securities Market Efficiency?425

11.6.3 Implications for Accountants426

11.7 Conclusions on Earnings Management427

12 Standard Setting:Economic Issues443

12.1 Overview443

12.2 Regulation of Economic Activity444

12.3 Ways to Characterize Information Production446

12.4 Private Incentives for Information Production447

12.4.1 Contractual Incentives for Information Production447

12.4.2 Market-Based Incentives for Information Production449

12.4.3 Securities Market Response to Full Disclosure450

12.5 A Closer Look at Market-Based Incentives452

12.5.1 The Disclosure Principle452

12.5.2 Signalling456

12.5.3 Financial Policy as a Signal459

12.5.4 Private Information Search460

12.5.5 Summary461

12.6 Sources of Market Failure462

12.6.1 Externalities and Free-Riding462

12.6.2 The Adverse Selection Problem463

12.6.3 The Moral Hazard Problem464

12.6.4 Unanimity465

12.6.5 Summary465

12.7 How Much Information Is Enough?466

12.8 Decentralized Regulation468

12.9 Conclusions on Standard Setting Related to Economic Issues469

13 Standard Setting:Political Issues483

13.1 Overview483

13.2 Two Theories of Regulation484

13.2.1 The Public Interest Theory484

13.2.2 The Interest Group Theory485

13.2.3 Which Theory of Regulation Applies to Standard Setting?486

13.3 Conflict and Compromise486

13.3.1 An Example of Constituency Conflict486

13.3.2 Comprehensive Income489

13.3.3 Conclusions Regarding Comprehensive Income491

13.4 Rules-Based versus Principles-Based Accounting Standards492

13.5 Criteria for Standard Setting493

13.5.1 Decision Usefulness493

13.5.2 Reduction of Information Asymmetry493

13.5.3 Economic Consequences of New Standards494

13.5.4 The Political Aspects of Standard Setting495

13.5.5 Summary496

13.6 International Integration of Capital Markets496

13.6.1 Convergence of Accounting Standards496

13.6.2 Effects of Customs and Institutions on Financial Reporting497

13.6.3 Enforcement of Accounting Standards499

13.6.4 Benefits of Adopting High Quality Accounting Standards500

13.6.5 Should Standard Setters Compete?501

13.6.6 Summary of Accounting for International Capital Markets Integration502

13.7 Conclusions and Summing Up503

Biblography513

Index531