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Introduction by Aulis Aarnio1

1 The Dilema of Legal Reasoning: Moral Evaluation or Description of the Law?13

1.1 A Theory of Legal Reasoning13

1.2 Legal Decision-Making and Evaluations14

1.2.1 Introduction.Subsumption in Clear and Hard Cases14

1.2.2 Interpretative Problems - Ambiguity, Vagueness and Value-Openess16

1.2.3 Gaps in the Law18

1.2.4 Evidence of Facts20

1.2.5 Choice of a Legal Norm20

1.2.6 Choice of a Legal Consequence21

1.2.7 Obsolete Laws and Desuetudo22

1.3 The Concept “Legal Decision-Making”22

1.4 Why do the Lawyers Need Special Interpretation Methods?24

1.4.1 Expectation of Legal Certainty24

1.4.2 The Law and Democracy27

1.5 Legal Knowledge?33

1.5.1 Introductory Remarks on Theoretical and Practical Statements33

1.5.2 Legal Interpretatory Statements34

1.5.3 The Main Problem: Knowledge, Truth and Rightness In Legal Reasoning35

2 Rationality of Moral Judgments39

2.1 Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism39

2.2 Practical and Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements42

2.2.1 Practical Meaning42

2.2.2 More About Practical Meaning.Norms and the Will43

2.2.3 Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements:Justifiability44

2.2.4 Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements:L-, S- and D-rationality45

2.3 More About Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements Prima-facie Moral Statements47

2.3.1 Criteria of Moral Goodness47

2.3.2 General Theories of the Morally Good48

2.3.3 Prima-facie Character of Moral Theories and Criteria49

2.3.4 The Step From Theoretical Propositions to Prima-facie Practical Conclusions53

2.3.5 Permissibility-Making Facts55

2.3.6 Claim-Making Facts57

2.3.7 Competence-Making Facts59

2.3.8 Complex Right-Making Facts60

2.4 Weighing and Balancing61

2.4.1 Principles and Values61

2.4.2 All-Things-Considered Practical Statements62

2.4.3 Weighing and Balancing of Principles63

2.4.4 Weighing Rules66

2.4.5 Final Act of Weighing and Balancing67

2.4.6 A Step From Theoretical Propositions to Definitive Practical Statements?69

2.4.7 The Step From Practical Statements To Theoretical Conclusions75

2.4.8 Concluding Remarks Concerning Logical Relations Between Theoretical and Practical Statements76

2.5 Some Examples of the Role of Weighing in Moral Theories77

2.5.1 Introductory Remarks77

2.5.2 Weighing Preferences: Hare’s Utilitarianism77

2.5.3 Weighing Practices: MacIntyre’s Theory of Virtue81

2.6 Examples of Weighing in Theories of Justice83

2.6.1 Justice, Equality and Weighing83

2.6.2 The Role of Weighing In John Rawls’s Theory of Justice86

2.6.3 The Role of Weighing In Robert Nozick’s Theory of Justice90

2.6.4 Some Concluding Remarks on Justice93

2.7 Support in Moral Reasoning95

2.7.1 Gaps and Jumps in Moral Reasoning95

2.7.2 The Concept of a Jump96

2.7.3 The Concept of a Reasonable Premise96

2.7.4 The Concept of Reasonable Support97

3 Rationality of Legal Reasoning99

3.1 Support of Legal Reasoning.Introduction and an Example99

3.1.1 Fixity of Law.Extensive Support of Legal Reasoning99

3.1.2 An Example of Extensively Supported Legal Reasoning100

3.1.3 An Example of Analysis of Legal Concepts -the Concept of Adequacy100

3.1.4 An Example of Substantive Reasons in the Law.The Purpose of Protection.Influence of Moral Theories and Criteria103

3.1.5 An Example of Legal Authority Reasons.Brief Remarks on Precedents104

3.2 Analysis of Support in Legal Reasoning105

3.2.1 Legal Reasoning As a Dialogue.Reflective Equilibrium and Hermeneutical Circle105

3.2.2 Legal Reasoning As an Inference.An Example107

3.2.3 Legal Reasoning As a Reasonable Jump109

3.2.4 Strong Support110

3.2.5 Depth of Reasoning113

3.3 Legal Rationality and Legal Paradigm115

3.3.1 Introductory Remarks on Legal Paradigm115

3.3.2 Some Theories of Science115

3.3.3 Theory of Science and Legal Reasoning117

3.3.4 Certain Premises121

3.3.5 Presupposed Premises124

3.3.6 Proved Premises of Legal Reasoning126

3.3.7 Other Reasonable Premises of Legal Reasoning126

3.3.8 Reasonableness and Falsification128

3.3.9 The Problem of Fundamental Justification of Legal Reasoning129

4 The Ultimate Justification of Moral and Legal Reasoning131

4.1 Coherence131

4.1.1 Introductory Remarks131

4.1.2 The Concept and Criteria of Coherence132

4.1.3 Properties of the Supportive Structure133

4.1.4 Properties of Concepts140

4.1.5 Properties of the Objects the Theory Deals With143

4.1.6 Weighing and Balancing of Criteria of Coherence144

4.2 Coherence, Correctness and Truth145

4.2.1 Coherence and Rational Thinking145

4.2.2 Coherence, Data, Presuppositions and Correctness146

4.2.3 Theories of Truth147

4.2.4 More About the Correspondence Theory of Truth149

4.2.5 Conclusions About Truth and Coherence150

4.2.6 Truth and Correctness of Practical Statements152

4.3 Rational Discourse152

4.3.1 Introductory Remarks on D-Rationality152

4.3.2 Robert Alexy’s Rules for Rational Practical Discourse154

4.3.3 Robert Alexy’s Principles of Rationality157

4.3.4 Robert Alexy’s Rules For Rational Legal Discourse158

4.4 Why Shall Legal Reasoning be Rational?160

4.4.1 Introduction.Why Shall Theoretical Propositions Be Consistent and Highly Coherent?160

4.4.2 Why Shall Practical Statements Be Logically Consistent?161

4.4.3 Why Shall Practical Statements Be Highly Coherent? Some Conceptual Reasons164

4.4.4 Some Conceptual Reasons for Rationality of a Practical Discourse165

4.4.5 Why Shall Practical Statements Uttered Within Legal Reasoning Be Rational? Some Conceptual Reasons166

4.4.6 The Concepts and Life167

4.4.7 Why Shall Practical Statements Be Highly Coherent? Some Empirical and Technical Reasons168

4.4.8 Why Should a Discourse be Rational? Empirical,Technical and Universally-Pragmatic Reasons170

4.4.9 Why Should Practical Statements Uttered Within Legal Reasoning be Rational? Some Further Reasons171

5 What is Valid Law?173

5.1 What is a Valid Law? - Introductory Remarks173

5.1.1 Starting Point: Rationality and Fixity173

5.1.2 The Purpose of our Theory of Valid Law174

5.1.3 Normative Character of the Concept “Valid Law”175

5.2 Law and Morality - On Natural Law176

5.2.1 Introductory Remarks176

5.2.2 An Example of Empirical Theory of Natural Law178

5.2.3 Some Critical Remarks on Natural-Law Theories180

5.3 Law and Morality - Legal Positivism180

5.3.1 Hans Kelsen’s “Pure” Theory of Law180

5.3.2 Herbert Hart’s Theory of Law186

5.3.3 The Institutionalist Legal Positivism190

5.3.4 Limitations of Classical Theories of Valid Law194

5.4 More about Law and Morality195

5.4.1 Prima-facie Law and its Relation to Prima-facie Morality195

5.4.2 The Justification of the Relation Between the Law and Prima-facie Moral Norms.Why Ought One to Follow the Law?198

5.4.3 Weighing Legal Rules203

5.4.4 All-Things-Considered Law as Interpreted Law203

5.4.5 The Relation Between the All-Things-Considered Legal Norms and All-Things-Considered Moral Norms205

5.4.6 Gaps in Interpreted Law.Legal Interpretation and Moral Criticism206

5.4.7 The Right to Resist Oppression207

5.5 The Question of Existence of the Law.Legal Realism210

5.5.1 Introductory Remarks.Axel Hagerstrom’s Philosophical Starting Points210

5.5.2 Karl Olivecrona On Independent Imperatives and Their Functions211

5.5.3 Tore Stromberg’s Conventionalism213

5.5.4 Alf Ross’s Predictionism214

5.5.5 Some Critical Remarks On Legal Realism216

5.5.6 The Three Worlds218

5.5.7 Components of Valid Law219

5.6 Norms as a Component of Valid Law220

5.6.1 Introductory Remarks On Legal Norms220

5.6.2 Internal Validity of Legal Norms222

5.6.3 External Validity of Legal System.Criteria Concerning the Content of Norms224

5.6.4 Regulative Norms225

5.6.5 Constitutive Norms226

5.7 More About External Validity of Legal System:Action as a Component of Valid Law231

5.8 Fact and Values in the Law232

5.8.1 More About External Validity of Legal System:Law-Making Facts232

5.8.2 Ought-Making Facts As Law-Making Facts234

5.8.3 Evaluative Openness of Valid Law236

5.8.4 The Basic Norm For the Law239

5.8.5 A Classification of Jumps and Transformations in Legal Reasoning244

5.9 One Right Answer to all Legal Questions?245

5.9.1 Introductory Remarks245

5.9.2 The Right Thesis246

5.9.3 The Right Answer Thesis249

5.9.4 The Incommensurability Thesis251

5.9.5 Existence of All-Things-Considered Law253

5.9.6 Some Remarks on “External Scepticism”254

5.9.7 Alexy on the Right Answer255

6 The Doctrine of the Sources of the Law257

6.1 Substantive Reasons and Authority Reasons.The Sources of the Law257

6.1.1 Introductory Remarks257

6.1.2 Substantive Reasons and Rationality257

6.1.3 Authority Reasons and Fixity259

6.1.4 Sources of Law260

6.2 Must-Sources, Should-Sources and May-Sources of the Law261

6.2.1 Why Three Categories of Sources of Law?261

6.2.2 Concepts of Must-, Should- and May-Source262

6.3 Norms Concerning the Sources of the Law264

6.3.1 The Character of Source-Norms264

6.3.2 Complexity of the Swedish Doctrine of the Sources of Law266

6.3.3 Are Substantive Reasons Sources of the Law?269

6.4 Custom270

6.5 Precedent272

6.5.1 Introductory Remarks272

6.5.2 Ratio Decidendi and Rationality273

6.5.3 Why and To What Extent Ought One to Follow Precedents?274

6.5.4 Methods of Justifying Judicial Decisions275

6.5.5 Coherence of Judicial Decisions278

6.5.6 The Role of Precedents in Swedish Law280

6.6 Legislative Preparatory Materials282

6.6.1 Introductory Remarks282

6.6.2 Ratio Legis282

6.6.3 Is Subjective Interpretation of Statutes Possible?283

6.6.4 Is Ratio-Legis Compatible with Democracy?285

6.6.5 Should One Pay Attention to Preparatory Materials?287

6.6.6 The Role of Preparatory Materials in Swedish Law.General Remarks289

6.6.7 The Role of Preparatory Materials in Swedish Law.Some Source-Norms292

6.7 Professional Juristic Literature295

6.8 Foreign Laws298

6.9 Draft Statutes and Formerly Valid Law301

7 The Methods of Legal Reasoning305

7.1 Reasoning Norms305

7.1.1 Construction of Statutes in Hard Cases305

7.1.2 Reasoning Norms307

7.2 Logical, Literal and Systematic Interpretation310

7.2.1 Logical and Quasi-Logical Interpretation310

7.2.2 Literal Interpretation312

7.2.3 Systematic Interpretation314

7.3 Reduction, Restrictive Interpretation, Extensive Interpretation and Creation of New Norms317

7.4 Conclusion by Analogy320

7.4.1 Introductory Remarks on Statutory Analogy320

7.4.2 The Origin and Justification of Statutory Analogy321

7.4.3 Law-Analogy and Legal Induction321

7.4.4 Argumentum e contrario322

7.4.5 The Choice Between Analogy and Argumentume contrario323

7.4.6 Argumentum a fortiori328

7.5 Teleological Construction of Statutes329

7.5.1 The Basic Structure329

7.5.2 Subjective and Objective Teleological Interpretation of Statutes330

7.5.3 Radical Teleological Interpretation of Statutes331

7.5.4 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelof.Introductory Remarks333

7.5.5 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelof.The Problem of Preciseness334

7.5.6 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelof.Multiple Goals337

7.5.7 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelof.Restricted List of Interpretatory Methods and Sources of Law337

7.5.8 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelof.Conclusions339

7.6 Solution of Collisions Between Legal Norms340

7.6.1 Collisions of Rules and Principles340

7.6.2 Collision Norms342

Bibliography347

Index357