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Part Ⅰ Law as a Complex Practice: The Rule-Based Model5

1 Legal Theory as a Scientific Discipline and the Variety of Rules5

1.1 Preliminary5

1.2 Austin and the Autonomy of Legal Theory6

1.3 Kelsen and the Scientific Amendment of Legal Positivism10

1.4 Beyond Commands and Imperatives: The Puzzle of Secondary Rules13

2 Legal Validity and the Problem of Rule-Acceptance19

2.1 Preliminary19

2.2 Four Notions of Acceptance21

2.3 The Ambiguities of Acceptance as Observance27

3 Reflective Acceptance: Reasons for Action and Criterion-Rules31

3.1 Preliminary31

3.2 Internal Point of View and Rule-Government33

3.3 Rules as Reasons for Action36

3.4 Habits, Rules and the Limits of Hart's Approach38

3.5 A Quasi-Wittgensteinian Reading of the Practice Theory41

3.6 Criterion-Rules and Conditions of Thinkability46

4 The Legal Practice and Its (Vanishing) Borders49

4.1 Preliminary49

4.2 The 'Payne Problem': Relevant Population and Lay People50

4.3 Rule-Based Model of What?54

4.4 Law as a Practice Among Practices60

Part Ⅱ Law as a Selective Practice: The Social and the Legal67

5 The Pluralist Divide67

5.1 Preliminary67

5.2 The Reasons for Legal Pluralism: Pragmatic and Conceptual Arguments68

5.3 First Type of Pluralism: Law as Organisation71

5.3.1 Eugen Ehrlich: The Living Law of Associations72

5.3.2 Santi Romano: Institutions as Legal Orders76

5.4 Second Type of Pluralism: The Artificial Character of Law79

5.4.1 Sally Falk Moore: The Dialectic Spontaneity/Artificiality79

5.4.2 Marc Galanter: The Historicity of Legal Borders83

5.5 Third Type of Pluralism: The Dissolution of Legal Pluralism86

5.5.1 Sally Engle Merry: Law as Frame of Significance87

5.5.2 Brian Tamanaha: The Praxiological Way-Out90

5.6 Legal Pluralism: A Provisional Assessment94

6 Legal Pluralism Revised: Law as the Product of Selection99

6.1 Preliminary99

6.2 The Root of All Evils: The Malinowski Problem99

6.3 Legal Selection and Legitimate Coercion: Hoebel's View105

6.4 Towards a Concept of Law as a Selective Practice111

7 Classic Institutionalism: Jural Reality and Legal Selection113

7.1 Preliminary113

7.2 Institutions, Inner Orders, and Romano's Dilemma114

7.3 Jural Reality and Official Law119

7.4 Integrating Institutionalism: Thin Functionalism125

8 Exploring the Jural Continuum127

8.1 Preliminary127

8.2 The Background of Social Practices128

8.3 Criterion-Rules, Instance-Rules, Norm-Rules132

8.4 The Jural Continuum: Practices, Institutions, Organisations139

8.5 Relevant Population and Lay People Reconsidered144

Part Ⅲ The Law as a Special Practice: Legal Field and Social Reality151

9 Negotiating Reality: Knowledge and Categories in the Legal Field151

9.1 Preliminary151

9.2 Law as a Trans-Sectional Venue152

9.3 Law and Its Custodians: The Paradigmatic Case of the Roman ius157

9.4 The Semiotic Circuit of Law: The Intriguing Case of Mekgwa Le Melao162

9.5 Is Productive Circularity Really Distinctive? A Theoretical Objection167

9.6 The Indispensable Self-sufficiency173

10 The Ritual Dimension of Law: Normality, Normativity, and Critique177

10.1 Preliminary177

10.2 Ritual and the 'Question of Plausibility'178

10.3 Law's Nondiscursive Dimension: Normality and Normative Facts187

10.4 Law's Discursive Dimension: The Space for Critique190

Epilogue195

Defending a Pluralist Critical-Institutional View of Law195

Bibliography201

Author Index209

Subject Index213