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Prologue: A brief history of the ancient juridical city of Fictionopolis1

PART Ⅰ: CONTEXT5

CHAPTER Ⅰ Contradiction, critique and criminal law7

1 INTRODUCTION7

2 RATIONALITY AND LEGALITY8

3 INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE10

4 UNDERSTANDING THE CONTRADICTIONS12

CHAPTER 2 The historical context of criminal doctrine15

1 INTRODUCTION15

2 LEGAL INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIAL INDIVIDUALITY16

(ⅰ) Justice and deterrence in the penal theory of the Enlightenment16

(a) The reformers’ task16

(b) Retributive justice17

(c) Utilitarian deterrence18

(d) The need for legality19

(ⅱ) Interests and ideology in reform penal theory19

(a) Middle-class interests20

(b) Middle-class interests and moral-legal individualism20

(c) Abstractions and realities21

(d) The character of modern law: its repressive individualism23

3 LEGAL INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIAL CONTROL24

(ⅰ) The common law and the criminal law in history25

(ⅱ) Logic, ‘policy’ and social class26

4 THE FOUNDATIONAL TENSIONS OF CRIMINAL DOCTRINE28

(ⅰ) Law’s psychological individualism28

(ⅱ) Law’s political individualism29

PART Ⅱ: MENS REA33

CHAPTER 3 Motive and intention35

1 INTRODUCTION35

2 MOTIVE AND INTENTION: DESOCIALISING INDIVIDUAL LIFE36

(ⅰ) Conflicting motives and common intentions36

(ⅱ) Hidden motives39

(a) Individual morality39

(b) Political morality40

(c) Social mores41

(ⅲ) Informal remedies to the formal politics of denial44

(a) Discretion to prosecute44

(b) Discretion to convict45

(c) Discretion in sentencing45

3 INDIRECT INTENTION: LEGAL AND MORAL JUDGMENT46

(ⅰ) Two approaches to direct and indirect (oblique) intention47

(a) The formal psychological (‘orthodox subjectivist’) approach47

(b) The morally substantive approach49

(c) Summary of the two approaches50

(ⅱ) The law of oblique intention: Moloney50

(a) Guidelines to a jury in Moloney52

(b) Moloney’s intended practical impact52

(ⅲ) Having one’s subjectivist cake and eating it: interpreting Moloney53

(a) Guidelines to a jury: Hancock and Shankland53

(b) Hancock and Shankland’s practical impact54

(ⅳ) The Moloney-Woollin axis55

(a) Woollin and the parameters of indirect intention55

(b) Woollin and the two approaches to intention56

(c) ‘Entitled to find’ and the moral threshold56

4 CONCLUSION58

CHAPTER 4 Recklessness59

1 INTRODUCTION59

2 SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM IN THE LAW OF RECKLESSNESS61

(ⅰ) The judgment in Caldwell61

(ⅱ) Contradiction within Caldwell63

(ⅲ) A limitation of the orthodox subjectivist approach65

(ⅳ) A problem with the objectivist approach66

(ⅴ) A ‘third way’? Introducing ‘practical indifference’69

3 RECKLESSNESS AS PRACTICAL INDIFFERENCE70

(ⅰ) The concept of practical indifference70

(ⅱ) Two questions about practical indifference72

(a) Practical indifference and determinacy72

(b) Is practical indifference subjective?73

(ⅲ) The political limits of practical indifference74

4 THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF RECKLESSNESS76

(ⅰ) ‘Factual’ versus ‘moral’ recklessness76

(ⅱ) The roots of orthodox subjectivism77

(ⅲ) An objection: the ‘objective’ question in orthodox subjectivism79

5 CONCLUSION80

CHAPTER 5 Strict and corporate liability81

1 INTRODUCTION81

2 DIFFERENTIATION: STRICT LIABILITY83

(ⅰ) Introduction83

(ⅱ) The ideological and practical context of the strict liability offence85

(ⅲ) Strict liability and ‘real’ crime: a presumption of mens rea?87

(ⅳ) Conclusion90

3 ASSIMILATION: CORPORATE LIABILITY92

(ⅰ) Introduction92

(ⅱ) Conflating individual and corporate fault: the identity doctrine93

(ⅲ) The responsibility of an organisation: aggregation and beyond95

(a) Aggregation95

(b) An organisational approach96

(c) Problems with the organisational approach96

(d) Law reform proposals98

(e) Conclusion99

(ⅳ) Responsibility, social complexity and the corporate form100

(a) Economic integration and corporate responsibility100

(b) Social co-ordination and corporate punishment101

4 CONCLUSION103

PART Ⅲ: ACTUS REUS107

CHAPTER 6 Acts and omissions109

1 INTRODUCTION109

(ⅰ) Acts110

(ⅱ) Omissions111

2 ACTS111

(ⅰ) Conflicting conceptions of voluntariness112

(a) Physical involuntariness versus moral involuntariness112

(b) Physical involuntariness versus moral voluntariness114

(ⅱ) Limiting involuntariness115

(a) The requirement of unconsciousness115

(b) Intoxication, physical involuntariness and moral voluntariness116

(c) Denying involuntariness in situational liability cases119

(ⅲ) Conclusion120

3 OMISSIONS120

(ⅰ) Constructing the concept of an omission121

(a) The drowning infant/stranger122

(b) Killing and letting die123

(ⅱ) Juridifying the concept of an omission124

(ⅲ) Abstract right and social need126

(ⅳ) Beyond individualism?128

(a) The line drawing problem128

(b) Specific duties of citizenship?130

4 CONCLUSION132

CHAPTER 7Causation134

1 INTRODUCTION134

2 A CRITICAL APPROACH TO CAUSATION136

3 LIBERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE IMPUTATION OF CAUSATION137

4 ANALYSING THE CAUSATION CASES141

(ⅰ) The intervention of a new voluntary act141

(ⅱ) The intervention of an abnormal occurrence144

(a) The medical treatment cases144

(b) The ‘eggshell skull’ case147

(c) The regulatory context148

5 CONCLUSION149

PART Ⅳ: DEFENCES151

CHAPTER 8Necessity and duress153

1 INTRODUCTION153

2 NECESSITY154

(ⅰ) Necessity’s ambiguous history155

(ⅱ) Judgment and context: the case of Dudley and Stephens156

(ⅲ) The re-emergence of necessity159

(a) Necessity as Pandora’s Box159

(b) Duress of circumstances161

(c) Medical necessity162

3 DURESS164

(ⅰ) Conflicting positions in the recent murder cases164

(ⅱ) The conflict within the basic arguments165

(ⅲ) Further limits168

(a) Mistake of duress168

(b) Standard of resistance169

(c) Self-induced duress170

4 CONCLUSION171

CHAPTER 9 Insanity and diminished responsibility174

1 INTRODUCTION174

2 LAW AGAINST PSYCHIATRY: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF MADNESS176

(ⅰ) Law’s rational subject176

(ⅱ) The asylum and psychiatry176

(ⅲ) Conflicting views of crime178

3 BETWEEN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: THE LEGAL DEFENCES179

(ⅰ) Insanity179

(a) The breadth of the Rules: ‘disease of the mind’180

(b) The narrowness of the Rules: the two cognitive tests180

(ⅱ) Diminished responsibility182

(a) Meaning of terms182

(b) Conflict and co-operation in the law183

4 LAW AND PSYCHIATRY IN CONFLICT: THE POLITICS OF LAW REFORM185

(ⅰ) The post-Hinckley debate in the United States186

(ⅱ) Reform proposals in England and Wales187

5 LAW AND PSYCHIATRY COMBINED: THE DECONTEXTUALISATION OF MADNESS188

(ⅰ) Covering up for the law190

(a) Poverty and the insanity defence190

(b) Women and diminished responsibility191

(c) Limits to compassion and pragmatism192

(ⅱ) Covering up for society: men killing women192

6 CONCLUSION193

(ⅰ) The nature of madness193

(ⅱ) Law and psychiatry: consensus and conflict195

PART Ⅴ: CONCLUDING197

CHAPTER 10 Sentencing199

1 INTRODUCTION199

2 DETERRENCE201

(ⅰ) Individual deterrence and its social context203

(ⅱ) Individual versus general deterrence205

3 RETRIBUTIVISM207

(ⅰ) Introduction: ‘just deserts’ and sentencing208

(ⅱ) Legitimating the allocation of punishment209

(a) The ideal and the actual in classical retributivism210

(b) ‘Just deserts in an unjust society’?210

(ⅲ) Limiting punishment through proportionality212

(a) The classical approach212

(b) Cardinal and ordinal proportionality213

(c) The living standards analysis214

4 REHABILITATION AND INCAPACITATION214

(ⅰ) Individualism versus individualisation215

(ⅱ) Individualisation and sentencing216

(a) Rehabilitation216

(b) Incapacitation217

5 SENTENCING IDEOLOGIES: THE INTERNAL DYNAMIC OF CONFLICT218

(ⅰ) The antinomies of sentencing218

(ⅱ) A dominant rationale? The Criminal Justice Act 1991219

6 CONCLUSION220

CHAPTER 11 Conclusion222

1 THE POLITICAL NATURE OF JURIDICAL INDIVIDUALISM222

(ⅰ) Psychological individualism223

(ⅱ) Political individualism224

2 JURIDICAL INDIVIDUALISM IN THE CRIMINAL LAW225

3 CRIMINAL LAW AS PRAXIOLOGY231

Notes234

Bibliography253

Index265

Index of names271